Seton Hall University

eRepository @ Seton Hall
Law School Student Scholarship

Seton Hall Law

2017

Too Soon for Online Video Program Distribution
Regulation - Section 111 Compulsory Licenses
Will Do . . . For Now
Raquel C. Doering

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Doering, Raquel C., "Too Soon for Online Video Program Distribution Regulation - Section 111 Compulsory Licenses Will Do . . .
For Now" (2017). Law School Student Scholarship. 885.
https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/885

Raquel Doering

Too Soon for Online Video Program Distribution Regulation - Section 111 Compulsory
Licenses Will Do . . . For Now
Raquel Doering
I. INTRODUCTION
On December 19, 2014, the FCC released a notice of proposed rule making (NPRM),
which tentatively concluded to define online video program distributors providing linear streams
of programming as multichannel video programming distributors (MVPDs) under the
Communications Act.1 The FCC claims the change will insure that MVPDs have
nondiscriminatory access to programming.2 However, the new definition does not offer MVDPs
eligibility for Section 111 compulsory licenses.3 Section 111 compulsory licenses are tools
online video providers have been battling for in the courtroom.4
The 1976 Copyright Act adopted the Section 111 compulsory licenses for cable systems. 5
In 2012, the Second Circuit’s ivi II decision held that Internet retransmission services did not
constitute cable systems under Section 111 and therefore, were not entitled to Section 111
compulsory licenses.6 In Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. Aereokiller (more commonly known as Fox v.
FilmOn), decided on July16, 2015, Judge Wu of United States District Court for the Central
District of California interpreted Section 111 as allowing FilmOn, an online streaming service, to

1

Robyn Polashuk, Inside FCC Proposal To Regulate Online Video Distributors, LAW360 (Sept. 18, 2015),
https://www.cov.com/~/media/files/corporate/publications/2015/02/inside_fcc_proposal_to_regulate_online_video_
distributors.pdf.
2
John Eggerton, NCTA: FCC Can’t Redefine OVDs as MVPDs, Multichannel News (Apr. 3, 2015),
http://www.multichannel.com/news/technology/ncta-fcc-cant-redefine-ovds-mvpds/389403.
3
Polashuk, supra note 1.
4
See Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. AereoKiller, No. CV 12-6921-GW(JCx), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97305 at *36-37, 50
(C.D. Cal. July 16, 2015).
5
Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. AereoKiller, No. CV 12-6921-GW(JCx), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97305 at *19-20 (C.D.
Cal. July 16, 2015).
6
Id. at 36-37 (citing WPIX, Inc. v. IVI, Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 277-80 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2012).
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be eligible for a Section 111 compulsory license.7 In Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X
LLC, decided on December 2, 2015, Judge Collyer of the District Court of the District of
Columbia held that FilmOn X was not entitled to a Section 111 compulsory license.8
While the Supreme Court decided Aereo III in 2014, the decision is not on point.9 The
legal issues in Fox v. FilmOn are close and have significant commercial importance and Judge
Wu disagrees with the Second Circuit’s decision in ivi II.10 As a result, Judge Wu authorized an
immediate appeal to the Ninth Circuit.11 The FilmOn case from the District Court of the District
of Columbia was not yet decided when Judge Wu made his July ruling.12
This Note is divided into five parts. Part I of this Note serves as the Introduction. Part II
of this Note covers a brief history of the Copyright Act and highlights the two portions, which
are crucial to the Note’s argument: (1) the Transmit Clause and (2) the Section 111 Compulsory
license. Part III analyzes the current circuit splits regarding the entitlement of Section 111
licenses for online video program distributors. While the Second Circuit and District of
Columbia assert online video program distributors are not entitled to Section 111 compulsory
licenses, the District of Central California holds that online video program distributors fit under
Section 111’s definition of a cable system and may obtain compulsory license, as long as they
comply with the other provisions in the section. Part IV discuses the Federal Communications
Commission’s attempts to regulate online video program distributors. Part V serves as the
conclusion.

7

Fox TV Stations, 2015 LEXIS 97305 at *50.
Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X LLC, No. 13-758 (RMC), 2015 WL 7761052, at *2 (D.D.C. Dec. 2,
2015).
9
Fox TV Stations, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97305 at *27.
10
Id. at 50.
11
Id.
12
Fox TV Stations, 2015 WL 7761052, at *2.
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In this Note, I will argue that Judge Wu’s interpretation of Section 111 is correct and that
online video program distributors should be eligible for Section 111 compulsory licenses, if they
so chose and follow the requisite requirements. Further, I will establish that the FCC proposed
changes for online streaming services are unnecessary, unhelpful, and premature. Ultimately, it
will be up to Congress to enact legislation for online streaming services once the industry has
had more time to develop and thrive.
II. A BREIF HISTORY OF THE 1976 COPYRIGHT ACT
A. Pre-Section 111
In 1968, the Supreme Court decided Fortnightly Corp.13 The cable system in question
included antennas on hills with connecting cables on utility poles.14 The cables carried the
antenna’s signals to the television sets of the subscribers.15 The Court held that the cable system
did not infringe on the copyright holder, because the system “no more enhance[d] the viewer’s
capacity to receive the broadcaster’s signals” and operated no differently than if the individual
erected his own antenna and strung his own cables.16
In 1974, the Supreme Court decided Teleprompter Corp.17 By this time, cable systems
were originating their own programs, selling commercials, and interconnecting with other cable
television systems.18 Such advancements permitted cable systems to compete with broadcasters
for the television market. Nonetheless, the Court still held cable systems to be non-infringing.19
The Court recognized that the changes and expansions occurring in the industry could not be
controlled through “litigation based on copyright legislation enacted . . . when neither broadcast

13

Id. at 17.
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 392 (U.S. 1968).
15
Id.
16
Id. at 399-400.
17
Fox TV Stations, 2015 LEXIS 97305 at *18.
18
Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 405 (U.S. 1974).
19
Id.
14
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television nor CATV was yet conceived.”20 Rather, Congress needed to regulate the industry to
accommodate the changes and expansions.21
B. Enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976
Congress responded to the Teleprompter Corp. Court’s comment by enacting the 1976
Copyright Act.22 The 1976 Act superseded the Copyright Act of 1909 and became fully effective
on January 1, 1978.23 Two portions of the 1976 Copyright Act are particularly relevant to this
note: (1) the Transmit Clause and (2) the Section 111 Compulsory license.
First, the 1976 Act implemented the Transmit Clause, which defines a public
performance as “to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance . . . of the [copyrighted]
work . . . to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public
capable of receiving the performance . . . receive it in the same place or in separate places and at
the same time or at different times.”24
Second, the 1976 Act adopted the Section 111 compulsory license for cable systems.25
The Act defined a cable system as, “a facility, located in any State, territory, trust territory, or
possession of the United States, that in whole or in part receives signals transmitted or programs
broadcast by one or more television broadcast stations licensed by the Federal Communications
Commission, and makes secondary transmissions of such signals or programs by wires, cables,
microwave, or other communications channels to subscribing members of the public who pay for
such service.”26

20

Id. at 414.
Id.
22
Fox TV Stations, 2015 LEXIS 97305 at *18.
23
UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE: GENERAL GUIDE TO THE COPYRIGHT ACT (Sept. 1977),
http://copyright.gov/reports/guide-to-copyright.pdf.
24
Fox TV Stations, 2015 WL 7761052, at *2.
25
Fox TV Stations, 2015 LEXIS 97305 at *18.
26
17 USCS § 111.
21
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The current litigation regarding online video program distributors concentrates on the
interpretations and applications of the Transmit Clause and the Section 111 Compulsory License
of the 1976 Copyright Act.27 This is not the first time the courts and Congress have been
challenged with the interpretations and applications of these two clauses.28 In the 1980s and
1990s, satellite retransmission posed similar issues for the courts and Congress.29
C. Additional Legislation for New Forms of Broadcast Retransmission
Several years after the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1967, satellite retransmission
and the accompanying changes and expansions presented issues for the application of the
Copyright Act of 1967.30 In 1988, the United States District Court of the Northern District of
Georgia held that a satellite broadcaster was not entitled to the Section 111 compulsory license. 31
Since that decision, the courts and Congress battled as to whether satellite broadcasters were
entitled to Section 111 compulsory licenses for over a decade.32 In 1991, the Copyright Office
even promulgated regulations denying satellite broadcasters the right to Section 111 licenses.33
In 1999, Congress enacted Section 122, which authorized satellite carriers to retransmit
local broadcast programming back into a local market.34 Section 122 has been amended five
times with the latest amendment issued in 2014.35
Although satellite retransmission is not at issue in this Note, Section 122’s enactment is
mentioned to illustrate the trajectory of a new form of technology, other than cable, from

27

See generally WPIX, Inc. v. IVI, Inc., 691 F.3d 275 (2d Cir. 2012); Fox TV Stations, 2015 LEXIS 97305; Fox TV
Stations, 2015 WL 7761052.
28
Fox TV Stations, 2015 LEXIS 97305 at *21-25.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 21.
32
Id. at 21-25.
33
Fox TV Stations, 2015 LEXIS 97305 at 22.
34
Id. at 21-25.
35
Id. at 25.
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technological inception to Congressional regulation.
This brief history of the 1976 Copyright Act, including its enactment and application and
treatment in the courtroom, sets the foundation for the arguments in this Note.
III. CURRENT SECTION 111 LITIGATION AND THE CIRCUIT SPLITS
Currently, online video program distributors are fighting for entitlement to Section 111
compulsory licenses in response to copyright infringement suits filed against them by various
television, film, and productions companies.36 In WPIX, Inc. v. IVI, Inc. (more commonly known
as the ivi II decision), the Second Circuit held that Internet retransmission services were not
entitled to Section 111 compulsory licenses.37 In the District of Columbia FilmOn decision,
Judge Collyer agrees with the Second Circuit.38 In the District of Central California FilmOn
decision, Judge Wu’s interpreted Section 111 as allowing FilmOn to be eligible for compulsory
licenses.39 While the Supreme Court decided Aereo III, which had to do with an online streaming
service, it is not on point and does not reconcile the circuit split.40
At issue in Aereo III was the Transmit Clause and whether the online streaming services
are infringing on the broadcasters’ right to public performance.41 The circuit split at issue in this
Note revolves around whether the streaming services in the ivi decision, District of Central
California District Court FilmOn decision, and the District of Columbia District Court FilmOn
decision should have been entitled to Section 111 compulsory licenses.
A. The Second Circuit’s ivi Decision

36

See generally WPIX, Inc. v. IVI, Inc., 691 F.3d 275 (2d Cir. 2012); Fox TV Stations, 2015 LEXIS 97305; Fox TV
Stations, 2015 WL 7761052.
37
WPIX, Inc. v. IVI, Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 284-85 (2d Cir. 2012).
38
Fox TV Stations, 2015 WL 7761052, at *24.
39
Fox TV Stations, 2015 LEXIS 97305 at *50.
40
Id. at 27.
41
Id. at 26-27.
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In the ivi cases, plaintiffs-appellees, the producers and owners of copyrighted television
programming, sued defendants-appellants ivi, Inc. and its Chief Executive Officer for streaming
plaintiff’s copyrighted television programming over the Internet live without their consent.42 At
issue was whether ivi constituted a cable system under Section 111.43 If the Second Circuit were
to answer that question in the affirmative, ivi had a statutory defense to plaintiff’s claims of
copyright infringement, and ivi was entitled to a compulsory license to continue retransmitting
plaintiff’s programming.44
To decide the issue, the Second Circuit utilized the two-step process outlined in Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.45 First, the court must consider whether Congress
has clearly spoken on the issue of Internet retransmission in Section 111.46 If Congress’s intent is
clear, courts “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”47 Second, if
Congress has not specifically addressed the question at bar, the court may “defer to an agency’s
interpretation of the statute, so long as it is ‘reasonable.’”48
First, in order to determine whether Congress had directly spoken on the issue of Internet
retransmission, the Second Circuit analyzed the congressional intent behind the Section 111
compulsory license.49 The court determined that based on the statutory text alone, it is not clear
whether a service that retransmits television programming live over the Internet constitutes a
cable system under Section 111.50 The Second Circuit could not determine whether an Internet
retransmission service (1) is or utilizes a “facility,” (2) receives and retransmits signals, (3)

42

WPIX, 691 F.3d at 227.
Id. at 279.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)).
47
WPIX, 691 F.3d at 279.
48
Id. at 227 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44).
49
WPIX, 691 F.3d at 280-84.
50
Id. at 280.
43
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through wires, cables, microwave, or other communication channels.51 Thus, the court posited
that it was unclear whether the Internet is a facility, as it is “neither a physical nor a tangible
entity;” rather it is “a global network of millions of interconnected computers.”52
The court then turned to legislative history and legislative intent.53 As to legislative
history, the court emphasized that Congress had codified statutory provisions for cable and
satellite but not for the Internet.54 Further, the court highlighted that Congress had not included
the “Internet” as an acceptable communication channel under Section 111.55 But, Congress did
add microwave as an acceptable communication channel in 199456
The Second Circuit articulated that the legislative intent “indicates that Congress enacted
Section 111 with the intent to address the issue of poor television reception, or, more
specifically, to mitigate the difficulties that certain communities and households faced in
receiving over-the-air broadcast signals by enabling the expansion of cable systems.”57 The
Court notes that Congress intended to support localized systems that used cable or optical fibers
to transmit signals through a physical, point-to-point connection between a transmission facility
and the television sets of individual subscribers.58
The Court asserted that Congress did not intend for Section 111 compulsory license to
extend to Internet transmissions.59 The court again addressed the failure of Congress to expressly
include Internet transmission into the language of Section 111.60 The court stated that history

51

Id.
Id.
53
Id. at 281-82.
54
WPIX, 691 F.3d at 281.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 282.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
WPIX, 691 F.3d at 282.
60
Id.
52
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indicates if Congress intended the Section 111 compulsory license to extend to Internet
transmissions, it would have done so expressly through the language of Section 111 as it did for
microwave retransmission or by codifying a separate statutory provision as it did for satellite
carriers.61 Instead, Congress’s statutory purpose was to address issues of reception and remote
access to over-the-air television signals.62 Internet retransmission does not fit into that statutory
purpose, because Internet retransmission services provide a national, maybe even international,
service.63
In determining whether the Congressional interpretation of Section 111 was reasonable,
the second step of Chevron, the Court discussed the position of the Copyright Office.64
According to the Court, Congress had not expressly delegated authority to the Copyright Office
to make rules carrying the force of law; “agencies charged with applying a statute . . . may
influence courts facing questions the agencies have already answered.”65 The Copyright Office
had continuously concluded that Internet retransmission services are not cable systems and do
not qualify for Section 111 compulsory licenses.66
For instance, the Copyright Office concluded that satellite carriers were not cable systems
under Section 111, because satellite carriers provide nationwide retransmission service and
because they are not located in their local service area.67 The Court articulated that under this
interpretation, Internet retransmission services could not constitute cable systems under Section
111 because they provide nationwide, and arguably global, services.68 Further, the Copyright

61

Id.
Id.
63
Id.
64
WPIX, 691 F.3d at 283.
65
Id. (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001)).
66
WPIX, 691 F.3d at 283.
67
Id. at 284.
68
Id.
62
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Office had consistently recognized that Section 111’s reference to “other communication
channels” should not be read broadly to include “future unknown services,” such as satellite,
multipoint distribution, and satellite master antenna television transmissions.69
Thus, the Second Circuit concluded that the Copyright Office’s position is reasonable and
persuasive.70 As a result, the Court held that ivi was not entitled to a Section 111 compulsory
license.71
B. Judge Wu’s District of Central California District Court FilmOn decision.
In July of 2015, the United States District Court for the Central District of California,
which falls within the Ninth Circuit, decided FilmOn.72 In the case, plaintiffs, the producers and
owners of copyrighted television programming, moved for a summary judgment against
defendants, FilmOn X LLC and its owner, claiming defendants are not entitled to a Section 111
compulsory license.73 The Court held that FilmOn is entitled to a Section 111 compulsory
license, once compliance with the statutory requirements is achieved.74 In reaching this decision,
the Court analyzed the Second Circuit’s ivi opinion.75 Judge Wu posited that the Second Circuit
employed an overly narrow reading of the Copyright Act.76 Further, the Court determined it was
unnecessary to turn to legislative history or the administrative interpretation as in ivi.77
To be able to make a decision on how the Copyright Act may or may not govern the
technology utilized by FilmOn, one must first obtain an understanding of the technology behind
the website streaming services. Judge Wu explains that FilmOn uses two different systems to

69

Id. (quoting 57 Fed. Reg. 3284, 3293-96).
WPIX, 691 F.3d at 284.
71
See Id. at 284-85.
72
See generally Fox TV Stations, 2015 LEXIS 97305.
73
Fox TV Stations, 2015 LEXIS 97305 at *2.
74
Id. at 50.
75
Id. at 35-43.
76
Id. at 36.
77
Id. at 40.
70
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receive and retransmit broadcast programming: a “trailer system” and a “Lanner system.”78 The
trailer system uses small antennas on the roof of a trailer.79 The Lanner system involves one
master antenna on the roof of a commercial data center.80 This master antenna routes the signals
to an antenna box where the signals are amplified and captured by small antennas.81 When a user
accesses the FilmOn website, the user’s computer requests a list of available programming, and
the FilmOn server responds with the list.82 When the user chooses a channel, the request is
directed to and managed by the local facility in the user’s surrounding area.83
With an understanding of FilmOn’s technology, Judge Wu began his analysis by first
examining the definition of a cable system from the 1976 Copyright Act.84 The definition reads
as follows: “A facility located in any State, territory, trust territory, or possession of the United
States, that in whole or in part receives signals transmitted or programs broadcast by one or more
television broadcast stations . . . and makes secondary transmissions of such signals or programs
by wires, cables, microwave, or other communications channels to subscribing members of the
public who pay for such service.”85 Judge Wu asserts that the Internet is not the facility urged by
Defendants.86 Therefore, the Internet cannot be a facility for the purposes of the Section 111
analysis.87
Without the Defendant’s facilities, the Internet does not receive Plaintiff’s broadcast
signal. Rather, antennas located within buildings within states receive the signals.88 The signals

78

Fox TV Stations, 2015 LEXIS 97305 at *7.
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Fox TV Stations, 2015 LEXIS 97305 at *7.
84
Fox TV Stations, 2015 LEXIS 97305 at *36-37.
85
Id. 37.
86
Id. at 39-40.
87
Id.
88
Id.
79
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are then retransmitted out of those facilities on “wires, cables, microwave, or other
communications channels.”89 “The facility that Defendants have control over and operate
consists of the ‘complicated electrical instrumentalities’ used for retransmission, which precede
‘the Internet’ in the Defendants’ retransmission scheme.”90 Thus, Judge Wu held that the Second
Circuit ivi decision was not persuasive and that FilmOn would be entitled to a Section 111
compulsory license, once the online video program distributors complied with all of the statutory
provisions listed in Section 111.91
C. Judge Collyer’s District of Columbia District Court FilmOn decision.
In November 2015, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, decided
FilmOn, as well.92 Just as in the District of Central California’s FilmOn case, plaintiffs are a
group of broadcaster and televisions networks, and defendant is FilmOn X LLC.93 Plaintiffs seek
the Court to adopt the reasoning in ivi II and Areo, while Film On X argues that the Court should
adopt Judge Wu’s reasoning.94
Again, to be able to make a decision on how the Copyright Act may or may not govern
the technology utilized by FilmOn, one must first obtain an understanding of the technology
behind the website streaming services. Judge Collyer explains that FilmOn assigns an individual
user to the content streams from one of thousands of very small antennas that FilmOn operates in
major metropolitan areas.95 This service allows viewers to watch television programming on any
computer or digital device.96

89

Fox TV Stations, 2015 LEXIS 97305 at *39-40.
Id. at 40.
91
Id at 50.
92
See generally Fox TV Stations, 2015 WL 7761052.
93
Fox TV Stations, 2015 WL 7761052, at *1.
94
Id. at *4.
95
Id. at *1.
96
Id.
90
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Judge Collyer sees this technology differently that Judge Wu.97 Judge Collyer admits
FilmOn has physical facilities (the dime-sized antennas) that capture the broadcast signals.
However, she asserts that FilmOn ultimately relies on the Internet to deliver the video content to
the subscriber.98 The detrimental distinction for FilmOn, according to Judge Collyer, lies in the
secondary transmission of the video content.99 Cable systems consist of a central antenna, which
receives the television signals, and a network of cables though which the signals are transmitted
to the receiving subscribers.100 Internet retransmission services have physical facilities that
receive the broadcast signals but retransmit them to Internet service providers, rather than
“directly” to the subscriber’s digital device.101
Judge Collyer posits that the retransmission distinction causes Internet-based
retransmission systems to fail to fit the Section 111(f)(3) definition of facility.102 According the
Judge Collyer, the definition reads as follows: “a physical ‘facility’ must receive the broadcast
signals and make the secondary transmissions to paying subscribers.”103 Judge Collyer
emphasizes that because FilmOn’s Internet-based retransmission system does not retransmit
signals “directly” to the subscriber nor does it deliver video content “exclusively” through wires,
cables, and microwave links, it does not qualify as a cable system.104 As such, Judge Collyer
denies FilmOn’s eligibility for a Section 111 compulsory license.105

97

See Fox TV Stations, 2015 WL 7761052, at *13.
Fox TV Stations, 2015 WL 7761052, at *13.
99
See Fox TV Stations, 2015 WL 7761052, at *13.
100
Fox TV Stations, 2015 WL 7761052, at *13.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Fox TV Stations, 2015 WL 7761052, at *24.
98
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D. Judge Wu Got it Right.
As with all splits on authority in the legal world, one must prevail. Judge Wu got it right:
online video program distributors should be entitled to Section 111 compulsory licenses, if they
so chose and follow the necessary requirements listed in the statute.106
Because the retransmission occurs from the antennas located within states to the wires,
cables, microwave, or other communications channels, Internet retransmission process precisely
matches the definition of a cable system in the Copyright Act of 1976.107 Thus, it is unnecessary
to turn to legislative history or the administrative interpretation as in ivi.108
Even if it were necessary, the Second Circuit’s Chevron analysis is not all that
persuasive.109 The Second Circuit asserts that the legislative history and the legislative intent
demonstrate that Congress did not intend for the Section 111 license to extend to the Internet.110
According to the Second Circuit, history indicates that if Congress desired such a result,
Congress would have expressly added language to the text of Section 111 as it did for microwave
retransmission or by codifying a separate statutory provision as it did for satellite carriers in
Section 122.111
However, Congress did not enact the Copyright Act until 1976 after Fortnightly and
Telecompter were decided in front of the Supreme Court.112 A case about whether online video
program distributors should be entitled to Section 111 license has not yet gone in front of the
Supreme Court.113

106

Fox TV Stations, 2015 LEXIS 97305 at *50.
See Fox TV Stations, 2015 LEXIS 97305 at 39-40.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 43.
110
WPIX, 691 F.3d at 282.
111
Id.
112
Fox TV Stations, 2015 LEXIS 97305 at *17-19.
113
See WPIX, 691 F.3d at 275, Fox TV Stations, 2015 LEXIS 97305 at *1 (showing both cases have yet to reach the
Supreme Court).
107
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As for a comparison with satellite retransmission, litigation started in 1988.114 In 1991,
the Copyright Office promulgated regulations denying satellite broadcasters the right to Section
111 licenses.115 In 1999, Congress enacted Section 122, which authorizes satellite carriers to
retransmit local broadcast programming back into a local market.116 The issue of whether online
video program distributors are entitled to Section 111 compulsory licenses has only been in
litigation since 2011.117
Based on the trajectories for cable and satellite, it is still too early for Congress to enact
legislation.118 Therefore, just because Congress has not yet enacted legislation for the Internet to
be entitled to Section 111 compulsory license, does not mean Congress did not intend for the
Internet to be so entitled.119
Judge Collyer hinges her District of Columbia District Court FilmOn decision on the
retransmission aspect articulated in the definition of a cable system in Section 111.120 She
appears to take a very strict reading of the definition and asserts that because FilmOn does not
retransmit signals directly to the subscriber, FilmOn is not a cable system and therefore, cannot
be entitled to a Section 111 compulsory license.121 What Judge Collyer fails to mention is that
the Section 111 definition of cable system does not include the word “directly.”122 Additionally,
Judge Collyer asserts that the Internet does not deliver video content “exclusively” through
wires, cables, and microwave links but relies on several types of distribution media, including

114

Fox TV Stations, 2015 LEXIS 97305 at *21.
Id. at 22.
116
Id. at 25.
117
See WPIX, 691 F.3d at 275 (showing that the case was decided in the Southern District of New York in 2011).
118
See supra notes 13-30.
119
Id.
120
Fox TV Stations, 2015 WL 7761052, at *13.
121
Id.
122
17 U.S.C. § 111(f)(3). In relevant part the statutory definition reads as follows, “and makes secondary
transmissions of such signals or programs by wires, cables, microwave, or other communications channels to
subscribing members of the public who pay for such service.” Id. The word “directly” is not present.
115
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satellite, cellular networks, and Wi-Fi.123 The Section 111 definition of cable system also does
not use the word “exclusively.”124 Thus, Judge Collyer decision is structured as a strict reading
of the Section 111 definition of cable system, yet her reasoning adds words that are absent from
the definition.
Further, while the Supreme Court’s decision in Aereo was not on-point as to the specific
issue of the multichannel video programming distributors’ entitlement to Section 111
compulsory licenses, the Supreme Court did make statements that are “about as close a statement
directly in [ivi’s] favor as could be made.”125 The Supreme Court posited, “Aereo bore an
‘overwhelming likeness to the cable companies targeted by the 1976 amendments.’”126 In full,
the Supreme Court stated,
[I]n Fortnightly the television signals, in a sense, lurked behind the screen, ready
to emerge when the subscriber turned the knob. Here the signals pursue their
ordinary course of travel through the universe until today’s ‘turn of the knob’ – a
click on a website – activates machinery that intercepts and reroutes them to
Aereo’s subscribers over the Internet. But this difference means nothing to the
subscriber. It means nothing to the broadcaster. We do not see how the single
difference, invisible to subscriber and broadcaster alike, could transform a system
that is for all practical purposes a traditional cable system into “a copy shop that
provides it patrons with a library card.”127
Further the Court’s Aereo decision’s reasoning “continues the trajectory started in Fortnightly
and seen again in the satellite decisions: courts consistently reject the argument that
technological changes affect the balance of rights as between broadcasters and re-transmitters in
the wake of technological innovation.”128

123

Fox TV Stations, 2015 WL 7761052, at *13.
17 U.S.C. § 111(f)(3). In relevant part the statutory definition reads as follows, “and makes secondary
transmissions of such signals or programs by wires, cables, microwave, or other communications channels to
subscribing members of the public who pay for such service.” Id. The word “exclusively” is not present.
125
Fox TV Stations, 2015 LEXIS 97305 at *27.
126
Id. at 26.
127
Id. at 26-27 (quoting ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2507 (2014)).
128
Id. at 27.
124
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Thus, Judge Wu got it right: online video program distributors should be entitled to
Section 111 compulsory licenses. While the courtroom battles over Section 111 compulsory
licenses have ensued, the Federal Communication Commission is attempting to solve the
copyright infringement tension between online video program distributors and television, film,
and productions companies through proposed regulation.
PART IV: FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION REGULATIONS
A. Federal Communications Commission’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
On December 19, 2014, the FCC released a notice of proposed rule making (NPRM).129
The NPRM tentatively concludes that online video program distributors providing linear streams
of programming shall be defined as multichannel video programming distributors (MVPDs)
under the Communications Act.130 In the notice of proposed rule making, the FCC stated, “We
propose the term MVPD to mean distributors of multiple linear video programming streams,
including Internet-based services.”131 The FCC views this definition as a modernized
interpretation of the term MVPD by including online video streamers, regardless of the
technology used to distribute the programming.132
The FCC identifies several business models that have emerged from online video
distribution.133 Subscription Linear, which makes available continuous, linear streams of video
programming on a subscription basis, includes SkyAngel and Aereo.134 Subscription OnDemand, which makes available on-demand content on a subscription basis, includes Amazon
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Prime Instant Video and Netflix.135 Transactional On-Demand, which makes available ondemand content to consumers on a per-episode or per-season/movie basis, includes Amazon
Instant Video and iTunes.136 Ad-based Linear and On-Demand, which offers linear and/or ondemand video programming on a free, ad-supported basis, includes FilmOn and Hulu.137
Transactional Linear, which offers non-continuous linear programming on a transactional basis,
includes pay-per-view UFC.138
The FCC tentatively concludes that only Subscription Linear video services are to be
considered MVPDs.139 This definition expansion would bring Subscription Linear video services
under the regulatory framework of the Communications Act.140 To understand the significance of
this result, it is necessary to delve into a very brief history of the Communications Act.
The Communications Act of 1934 created the Federal Communications Commission.141
Congress then amended the Communications Act of 1934 with the Telecommunications Act of
1996.142 The Act’s main purpose was to open up the communications industry to competition.143
More significant to this Note, the Act also subjects “multichannel video programming
distributors” (MVPD) to almost exclusive federal regulatory control.144
Hence, as MVPDs Subscription Linear video services would be subject to privileges and
obligations of the Communications Act.145 The privileges include nondiscriminatory access to
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certain programming and the assurance that broadcasters will negotiate in good faith for the
retransmission of content.146 The obligations included complying with requirements for
nondiscriminatory program carriage and parallel obligation for good faith negotiations for
broadcast retransmission consent, as well as competitive availability of navigation devices, equal
opportunities, closed captioning, video description, access to emergency information, signal
leakage, inside writing, and commercial loudness restrictions.147
This proposed change to the MVPD definition fails to modernize federal regulations to
successfully meet the advancement of today’s online video streaming technology. Instead, the
change merely creates a new category of online video distributors under the Communications
Act, which is not recognized under the Copyright Act.148 The new definition does not offer
MVDPs eligibility for a Section 111 compulsory license.149 Online video program distributors
would still need to negotiate with individual content owners and obtain licenses from broadcast
stations.150 Thus, the FCC’s proposed change does not address the currently litigated issue of
whether online video program distributors should be eligible for Section 111 compulsory
licenses.151
Without offering the Subscription Linear video services the benefit of statutory licenses,
the benefits provided to the online video program distributors under the proposed change are
illusory.152 MVPD is a term that comes from the 1992 Cable Act, and it’s meaning is clunky and
outdated.153 Due to the remarkable success of the online distribution industry, the burden should
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be on those who favor new regulations to prove the problems with the industry and explain why
a change is necessary.154
B. Judge Wu’s Decision Solves the Problem
While the FCC proposed change is unnecessary and unhelpful, Judge Wu’s decision in
FilmOn will allow online video program distributors to remain free from stifling regulations
while protecting such providers from being destroyed by copyright infringement suits.155 If an
online video program distributor so chooses, it can comply with the statutory requirements of
Section 111 and be eligible for a compulsory license.156 No matter how amazing and
revolutionary new online video program distribution technology may be, without access to
content, it cannot reach an audience.157
Additionally, compulsory licenses for online video program distributors offer several
benefits to all parties involved. First, parity for the compulsory licensing for online video
program distributors gives clarity and predictability for copyright owners and new businesses
operating in the television market.158 Creators and investors do not have to be wary as to whether
a new venture will violate copyright law.159 As long as the statutory requirements of Section 111
are met, the distributor would be entitled to the compulsory license.160 If Aereo had this option, it
probably would not have resulted to declaring bankruptcy in November of 2014 nor would it
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have been forced to auction off its assets, primarily to TiVo, in February of 2015.161 Second,
parity for online video program distributors will benefit consumers by furthering free choice and
promoting more efficient time shifting.162 Third, parity will benefit broadcasters.163 Broadcasters
have any interest in ensuring their longevity, and part of that longevity is remaining relevant to
as many viewers as possible, especially to younger audiences.164 Younger audiences tend to
access multimedia content via computers or tablets, rather than from traditional television.165
This solution and balance seems to be attractive to online video program distributors. In
fact, FilmOn has recently modified its service in an attempt to bring itself in compliance with
Section 111 requirements.166 FilmOn has indicated that users will only be able to watch
programs if they purchase local channel subscription packages.167 Such packages will be limited
to the television channels available in a designated market area.168 Additionally, FilmOn has
developed a “geolocation system” that only allows access to broadcast programming if the
viewer’s digital device is located within the original broadcaster’s market area at the time of the
retransmission.169 Further, FilmOn has made past royalty payments and filed Statements of
Account with the Copyright Office for, roughly, the past two years.170 The Copyright Office
accepted FilmOn’s documents on a “provisional basis,” since the question of whether online
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video program distributors are eligible for Section 111 compulsory licenses had been raised
before the courts.171
Thus, parity for compulsory licenses for online video program distributors is an efficient
and beneficial means to provide copyright infringement protection for online video program
distributors who desire it.
C. The Video Market Place Does Not Need Regulations . . . Yet.
The FCC’s proposed changes are simply premature.172 Currently, the online video
program distributor industry is thriving.173 Further, the Internet is redefining video.174 It is
“reshaping the video market place in ways we are just beginning to see.”175
The FCC buttresses its alleged need to reinterpret the statutory definition of MVDP under
one core premise: “that the continued evolution in Internet delivery of video programming
service requires regulatory intervention to provide ‘nascent, Internet-based’ video programming
service providers with competitive access to video programming.”176 However, market forces
have already stimulated and will continue to stimulate broadcasters, cable networks, and other
video programming to make content available to innovative, Internet-delivered, distribution
platforms.177 Not only is content being made available online through existing models, but the
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market is also creating new, robust business models, all while being largely free from
governmental intervention.178
The NPRM will jeopardize the diversity of programming that audiences enjoy today over
a variety of platforms.179 The current market environment has fostered significant investment in
online distribution of video and allowed market participants to experiment with both with new
technologies and new business models to support them.180 Imposing one-size-fits-all regulations
is ill suited to the Internet, and could destroy its diversity.181 What may work for one
entrepreneur may not work for others, and freedom to experiment is critical in the early years of
development and innovation.182
It is undisputed that the industry has grown and continues to bring consumers even more
benefits.183 For instance, the number of services lawfully providing access to movies and
television shows online grew from essentially zero in 1997 to more than 110 in 2014.184
Additionally, the number of times audiences used those services to lawfully access movies and
television shows online grew from 20 million and 2.8 billion, respectively, in 2005 to 5.7 billion
and 56.9 billion in 2013.185 These figures are expected to grow to 10.3 billion and 91.6 billion by
2018.186
In addition to the expansive growth of access and consumption demonstrated by the raw
data, the online video industry has achieved impressive successes, involving agreements and
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content, just over the summer of 2015 alone.187 For example, Hulu entered into a partnership
with Showtime, reached an agreement for additional seasons on Southpark, and began streaming
every episode of Seinfeld.188 Netflix announced the 2015 release dates for its first original feature
films.189 Amazon negotiated a deal for PBS’s Masterpiece franchise.190 Verizon agreed with
Scripps to carry HGTV, Food Network, and Travel Channel.191 Comcast began offering
Stream.192 Showtime and Lifetime launched new video streaming services.193 Increasingly
frequently, privately negotiated deals that benefit online providers, content creators, and
consumers, are being struck all without government intervention.194
This expansion and experimentation in the marketplace should be allowed to continue
without the suppression of regulation.195
D. Call to Congress
Among the most important ingredients in the success of the video marketplace is respect
for two fundamentally American values: free speech and intellectual property.196 Under the First
Amendment, the speaker and the audience act in the marketplace of ideas and determine what is
said and heard, not the government.197 The Copyright Clause respects the right of creators to
determine how to disseminate their works.198 Recognition of that respect increases production
and distribution of content for public benefit.199 The ability of content producers and distributors
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to decide what programming to create, license, and disseminate is what makes the online
marketplace so dynamic.200 That ability also allows companies to manage the economic risks of
competition and unpredictability in the online video marketplace.201 Management of that balance
enables producers and distributors to continue investing and innovating to deliver high-quality
content to consumers.202 The FCC’s NPRM will disrupt all of this.203
Ultimately, it is up to Congress to say what the law will be.204 The elimination of the
compulsory license is inevitable.205 When Congress does decide to eliminate the compulsory
license, it can enact legislation for the online video program distributors as it did for cable
retransmissions with Section 111 and for satellite retransmissions with Section 122. For the time
being, it is a logical and necessary solution to allow online video program distributors
entitlement to Section 111 compulsory licenses.
PART V: CONCLUSION
Whether multichannel video programming distributors are entitled Section 111
compulsory license hinges on how one interprets the role the Internet plays in the retransmission
of content, as described by Section 111(f)(3). This Note put for the position that Judge Wu’s
United States District Court for the Central District of California FilmOn interpretation and
decision should be upheld on its appeal, and if necessary, be upheld on an appeal to the Supreme
Court. Further, this Note asserted that the FCC’s proposed notice of rulemaking to expand the
definition of MVPDs to include Subscription Linear online video providers is unnecessary and
unhelpful. Instead, the online video program distribution industry can use Judge Wu’s decision
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for eligibility of Section 111 compulsory license if such a provider wishes to protect itself from
copyright infringement action. In fact, this solution and balance is attractive to online video
program distributors, as made evident by FilmOn’s recent compliance with Section 111
requirements. It is up to the industry to continue to self-regulate and keep certain theories of
regulation in the halls of academia and out of the marketplace. And, when the time is right, it
will be up to Congress to create a statue concerning online video program distributors. Currently,
the industry must be allowed to continue to grow and flourish. When Congress does enact
legislation for online video providers, Congress must assure the law is flexible enough to move
and change with the ever-evolving industry.
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